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THE DYNAMIC STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL TAX UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
Dug Man Lee and Kenneth S. Lyon

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a nomenewable resource model including
environmental pollution stock as a state variable to analyze the dynamic structure
of an optimal tax. Based on the optimality conditions of our model, we showed
that the optimal time path of the shadow cost of environmental pollution stock is
the same as that of the costate variable of environmental pollution stock. We
derived this statement by applying the Continuous Dependence on Initial
Conditions Theorem (Coddington, E.A. & N. Levinston 1984, pp. 22-27) to the
optimal control problem. Thus, this result provides a theoretical basis to
determine the magnitude of optimal tax to be imposed over time. In addition, we
observed the characteristics of two costate variables included in our model. We
identified that the costate variable for resource stock is decomposed between the
scarcity 3effect and the cost effect. On the other hand, the costate variable for
environmental pollution stock is solely due to the disutility effect.
JEL classification: Q30
Key words:

nomenewable resource, environmental pollution stock, costate
variables

THE DYNAMIC STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL TAX UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

Introduction
There are few subjects in economics that have been discussed as extensively as
the problem of environmental pollution. Following Pigou ' s initial insight on this subject
(1932), a numerous of studies have been undertaken to design environmental pol icies
for pollution abatement. In a static model analysis, it has been significantly suggested
that if a regulatory agency imposes the value of marginal social damage incurred by
environmental pollution as a Pigouvian tax, then the Pareto optimality in a society
would be attained (Baumol 1972, Baumol and Oates 1988). In this analysis, the value of
marginal social damage is denoted as the sum of the value of marginal disutility of
consumers and the marginal cost of firms with respect to the increment of
environmental pollution. On the other hand, as concerns about the spillover effect of
pollution in economic growth process have increased (Mishan, 1969, IPee 1990) two
approaches have been directed to observe the side effect of pollution on the optimal
endogenous variables in the model. One approach has modified the optimal growth
model to reflect environmental pollution (Forster 1973, Gruver 1976, Nordhaus 1993,
Selden and Song 1995) and the other one has changed the nonrenewable resource model
to include environmental pollution stock as a state variable (Forster 1984, Kolstad and
Toman 2001).
The main result of the modified optimal growth model is that the rate of both
the optimal consumption and capital at stationary state are lower than when
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environmental pollution is not considered (Forster 1973, Selden and Song 1995). A
modified nonrenewable resource model has shown that the optimal extraction of
resource is slowed in responding to the accumulation of pollution stock (Forster 1984,
Kolstad and Toman 2001). Similar to the suggestion in a static model analysis, dynamic
analyses considering environmental pollution have also proposed that levying the
shadow cost of environmental pollution stock as an optimal tax reduces the rate of
consumption of goods and extraction of resource stock over time; thereby, slowing the
accumulation of environmental pollution in the"future (Nordhaus 1993, Kolstad and
Toman, 2001). To support this proposition, we showed that the shadow cost of
environmental pollution stock at time t is equal to the costate variable for environmental
pollution stock at that time. We did this by applying the Continuous Dependence on
Initial Conditions Theorem (Coddington, E.A. and N. Levinston 1984, pp 22-27) to the
optimal control problem. Thus, if we identify the optimal time path of the shadow cost
of environmental pollution stock, then we can elicit the appropriate information about
the magnitude of optimal tax. For this purpose, below we first present a simple
nonrenewable resource model with environmental pollution stock. Second, we discuss
the characteristics of the costate variables for both resource stock and environmental
pollution stock, which are included in the model.

Nonrenewable Resource Model with Pollution Stock
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The objective of this problem is to maximize the discounted present value of
the net surplus stream subject to two constraints. These constraints are the laws of
motion for both nonrenewable resource stock and the environmental pollution stock.
The instantaneous utility function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, to
increase at a decreasing rate with extraction of nonrenewable resource, x , and to
decrease at an increasing rate with the environmental pollution stock, p. This properties
implies that

Uc

> 0,

U cc

< 0, and up> 0, u pp < 0. In addition, we assume that the cross

partial derivative of the resource stock and environmental pollution stock is zero,
i.e. u xp = 0. The extraction cost function is written as c(x(t), z(t» where z(t) is the
nonrenewable resource stock. We assume that extraction costs are increasing at an
increasing rate with the rate of extraction, c x > 0, c xx > 0, and are increasing as the
nonrenewable resource stock decreases, C z < o. Following the tradition of Forster
(1984) and Kolstad and Toman (2001), the dynamic optimization problem is to
maximize 3
T

(1)

W = fe-PI {u(x(t),p(t»- c(x(t),z(t»}dt + e-PTS(p(T»
o

subject to

3

In Forster (1984), he maximized the objective function under given T instead of considering it as

control parameter. In addition, he did not consider the terminal (scrap) value of environmental pollution
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dz(t)
dt

= _ x(t)

dp(t) = _ fJ p(t) + (J" x(t)
dt

z(o) = ZO given, p(O) = pO given
x(t), z(t), p(t) > 0

In the law of motion for the stock of environmental pollution, the first term on the righthand side denotes the natural rate of dissipation and decomposition of the existing
environmental pollution stock and the second term indicates that the generation of new
pollution is proportional to the extraction of the nonrenewable resource. Thus,
fJ and (J" are parameters with given values. p is the rate of time preference, and S( ) is

the terminal (scrap) value function at time T. The present value Hamiltonian with two
state variables is
pl

(2) H = e- {u(x(t), pet)) - c(x(t), z(t))} + A) (t){-x(t)} + ,.1,2 (t){-fJ pet) + (J" x(t)}

where A) (t) and ,.1,2 (t) are the present value costate variables for nonrenewable resource
stock and environmental pollution stock, respectively. We use the optimality theorem
for the Hestenes Bolza problem as stated in Long and Vousden (1977, pp 11-34) in
Theorem 1. In the terminology of this theorem, we have three control parameters. They
are T , the stopping time for extractions, z(T) , the nonrenewable resource stock at that
time, and p(T) , the environmental pollution stock at that time, In addition, we have a

stock in his model.

5

control variable, x(t). The present value necessary conditions for the optimality of
Equation (1) are

dA~ (t)
pi
•
•
- d- = e- c~(x (t),z (t))
t
dA; (t)
•
-;;t
= f3 A 2(t) - e-

pi

•

•

up (x (t), p (t))

dz· (t) = _ x· (t)
dt
dfl· (t)
_:t-'_

dt

z(O)

•

•

= -f3 p (t)+a x (t)

= zo,

p(O)

= po

And the present value transversality conditions are

A; (T · ) = e- rT • S· (p(T·))

e- pT {u(x· (T·), p. (T·)) - c(x - (T·), z - (T-))} - A; (T-)x· (T·)

+

A; (T·){-f3 p. (T-) + a x· (T·)) = 0

where asterisk (*) denotes the optimum .. Let us define current value costate
variables, If/i (t) ,as
conditions are

If/i (t)

= epl Ai (t)

(i

= 1,

2). Then, the current value necessary
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(4)
(5)

(6)

dlf/; (t)

•

- ' - - = P If/I (t)

dt

dlf/; (t)
dt

•
+ C z (x •
(t), z (t))
•

••

= (P+!3)1f/2(t)-U P (X (t),p (t))

dz· (t) = _ x· (t)
dt

dr> * (t)

=

-!3 p • (t) + a x • (t)

(7)

_1:'_

(8)

z(O) = zo, p(O) = po

dt

And the current value transversality conditions are

=0

(9)

If/; (T·) ~ 0,

(10)

1f/;(T*)=S'(p(T*))

(11)

u(x * (T·), p * (T·)) - c(x· (T·), z· (T·))

If/; (T·)z· (T·)

-If/; (T·)x· (T·)

As a marginal arbitrage equation, Equation (3) proposes that the marginal net surplus
(benefit) of resource extraction is equal to the shadow value of resource stock adjusted
to account for the shadow cost of additional pollution stock. The part of this sum on the
right-hand side of Equation (3) exists because the marginal unit of the resource has
value in other time periods, and the second part exists because the marginal unit of
extraction causes pollution. In both cases the marginal units are valued at the value of a
unit of the stock. This proposition implies that the optimal rate of resource extraction is
lower due to the negative external effect of increasing the stock of environmental
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pollution than when the externality is ignored. This slows the accumulation of
environmental pollution. Equation (4) shows the dynamic equation of the shadow value
of resource stock, and is consistent with the Hotelling's rule (1931). Equations (3) to (5)
give the information about how both economics and environmental pollution are
interrelated in determining the optimal time path of endogenous variables in the model.
Based on current value necessary as well as transversality conditions stated above, we
begin to examine the characteristics of costate variables included in this model

4

•

The Characteristics of Costate Variables
We first discuss the role of the optimal current value of costate variable for the
resource stock,

If/; (t) . The primary role of the shadow value of resource stock is to

ration the use of the resource stock between time periods. It does this by insuring that at
the margin the resource has the same discounted value in each time period. In addition,
as can be seen in Equation (9), at the optimal stopping time, T* , either the resource
stock is exhausted or the terminal shadow value is zero. At the terminal time, as shown
below the shadow value is due solely to a scarcity effect; therefore, if the resource stock
is not exhausted, it is not scarce and it's scarcity value is zero. The resource stock will
not be exhausted if extraction cost rise to a sufficiently high level relative to demand.

4

Lyon (1999) analyzed the costate variables for nonrenewable and renewable resource stock in separated

models, respectively. Our model is a good example to illustrate the characteristics of costate variables for
both nonrenewable and renewable resource stock at once.
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The optimal stopping time will be reached when the marginal net surplus (benefit) of
last time period is zero. This is the result of Equation (11).
The differential equation (4) with terminal value, If/; (T*) , has the solution (See
Appendix A for derivation).
T"

(13)

If/ ;

(t) = e- peT -I ) If/ ; (T * ) -

Je-

p( S-I) C z(x * (s ), z * (s))

ds

This equation shows the shadow value of the resource stock at time t, and it implies the
current value rate of change in the solution value of Equation (1) per unit change in
resource stock in time t. From time zero this can be stated as 8W* =
8z o

If/; (0),

where

W* is the optimal solution of Equation (1). The shadow value of resource stock can be

decomposed into two parts such as
e -peT -I ) If/2* (T*) ,

as the Scarcity Effect

T'

and

- Je-P(S-')cz(x*(s),z*(s))ds

as the Cost Effect

As discussed above, if the resource stock is not exhausted there exists no scarcity effect,
or a scarcity can occur only if the resource stock is exhausted. For the cost effect, the
cost effect approaches zero as t approaches the optimal stopping time, T* and in addition,
ifc z = 0 for all z, the cost effect is zero. Thus, the scarcity effect at time t shows simply
the terminal scarcity value discounted to the current time t, and the cost effect is the
present val ue of the cost saving associated with the marginal unit of resource stock.

9

Suppose we were to inject an epsilon unit of resource into the resource stock at time t.
This will affect the marginal unit all along the optimal path, starting at time t. In doing
so it affects the extraction cost all along the path from time t on. The cost effect is the
present value of these cost savings, as of time t. For the case where the resource stock is
exhausted and

Cz

< 0, the shadow value contains the cost savings associated with the

marginal unit and the present value of the scarcity effect of that unit. However, if the
resource stock is not exhausted but optimal extractions take place over a positive time
period, then the shadow value is due solely to the cost savings. At the other extreme, if
Cz

= 0, then the shadow value is due strictly to scarcity. For the case wherec z

< 0 and

the extractions are stopped before the resource stock is exhausted, the extraction cost
simply become too high to warrant further extractions. In this case, it is not the scarcity
that rations the extractions of the resource, but it is the extraction cost for further
depletion.
Second, we discuss the costate variable for the stock of environmental
pollution. To gain information about
equation with the terminal value,

'1/; (t), we examine Equation (5). This differential

'1/; (Tt) = S· (p(Tt)) , has the solution (See Appendix

B for derivation).

(14)

'I/;(t)

= e-(P+P)(T*-/)'I/;(T t ) +

r*

fe-(p+P)Sup(xt(s),pt(s)) ds

The optimal current value costate variable,

'1/; (t), gives the time path of the shadow
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cost of the environmental pollution stock. The costate variable for the stock of
environmental pollution, If/~ (t) , is the current value of the change of the solution of
Equation (1) per unit change in environmental pollution stock at time t. For time zero,
this can be stated as 8Wo• = If/~ (0) 5. Below, we derive this statement. To do this
8p
rigorously, let us define p. (t) = ¢/ (t, pO) be the optimal time path of p given the initial
condition is pO. With this we can write the optimal solution of Equation (1) as
r'

(15)

W· (po)

= fe-pi {u(x· (t),~f (t, pO)) - c(x· (t), z· (t)} dt + e- pr ' S(¢· (T·, pO)

°
Differentiation Equation (14) with respect to pO yields
(16)

We use Continuous Dependence on Initial Conditions Theorem (CDICT) to get the
information about¢·p o(t,po). Write Equation (7) as
ti1'';;I)

= )'(1,1"(1))

with p. (0) = pO

By CDICT, ¢*p (t, pO) satisfies the initial value problem
0

(17)

5

This is the common statement that the costate variable is the shadow value of the state variable.

11

This initial condition,~*p () (O,po)

= 1, exists so that

same rate as pO, keeping p *(0)

p*(O)

= ~*(O,po)will change at the

= pO. To gain some feel for this equation, note that a

solution of Equation (7),~*(t,po), means

o¢/ ~;pO)

= f(t,tP' (t,po))

a(a~* / at)

=

Hence,
~~o~

ap

I"
Jp'

(;/,*(
( 0)
t,'P t,p o));/,*
'P 0 t,p
P

and by Young's Theorem,

a(a~· / at)
apo

a~;o

-----at

Combining these yields Equation (17)
From Equation (5),

f·P (t,p*(t)) = -/3,

Thus
(18)
The solution of this initial value problem is
(19)

;/,*

'P o
P

(

_ -PI
t,p 0) -e

Inserting Equation (10), and (19) into the right-hand side of Equation (16), and
simplifying yields

12
8W *

*

- - 0 = 1j/2 (0)

8p

.

This result shows that the costate variable for environmental pollution stock is the
present value of cost stream of the marginal unit of environmental pollution stock. If
there is private ownership of the exhaustible resource and the sellers are price takers,
then the value of the resource will be competed into the market price of x; hence we can
generate the equality in Equation (3) by imposing an optimal tax of G'1j/; (t) per unit of

x . If this resource is fossil fuels then the tax results in reduced the rate of fossil fuel
extraction and thereby a reduction in the accumulation of environmental pollution.
In addition, we can separate the shadow cost of environmental pollution stock
into two components according to Equation (14):
e-(p+{J)(r· -I )

and

Ij/; (T*)

r·
fe-(p+{J)Sup(x*(s),p*(s)) ds

as the Undesirable Plenty Effect

as the Disutility Effect

The undesirable plenty effect is simply that the terminal value of environmental
pollution stock discounted to the current time t , and the disutility effect shows the
present value of the increment of disutility associated with the marginal unit of
environmental pollution stock increase. If we investigate this variable furthermore,
however, we identify that there are not two effects, but only one effect. They are both
the present value of the disutility effect. If the optimal stopping time comes from the
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nonrenewable resource and nonrenewable resource is only the source of environmental

pollution, the stock of environmental pollution will not be accumulated any more after
the optimal stopping time, and it will gradually disappear. Consequently, the stock of
environmental pollution is negligible when the time is extremely larger than the optimal
stopping time. In this sense, the terminal value of environmental pollution stock is
co

(20)

If/;(T*) = fe-CP+P)Sup(O,p*(s)) ds
T'

which is the disutility effect. Hence, in this case the undesirable effect is the disutility
effect. As a result, we conclude that the costate variable for the stock of environmental
pollution is solely due to the disutility effect. This is the difference from the costate
variable for resource, which is decomposed between the scarcity effect and the cost
effect.
Summary
We presented a nonrenewable resource model including environmental
pollution as a state variable. Based on the optimality conditions of our model, we have
shown that the optimal time path of the shadow value of environmental pollution stock
is the same as that of the costate variable for environmental pollution stock. Thus, if a
regulatory agency imposes some portion of the costate variable for environmental
pollution stock as optimal tax over time, it will reduce the rate of resource extraction,
and thereby slow the accumulation of environmental pollution. In addition, we have

14
discussed the characteristics of costate variables for both resource stock and
environmental pollution stock included in our model. We observed that the costate
variable for resource stock is decomposed between the scarcity effect and the cost effect.
On the other hand, we have shown that the costate variable for the stock of
environmental pollution is solely due to the disutility effect.
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APPENDIX A
The proof of Equation (13)
The Equation (4) is

dV; (t)

•

-'--= P VI (t) + c~~ (x
dt

••
(t), z (t))

with V; (T *) given by current value transversality condition. This can be arranged into

dV\*(t)
•
*.
- - - P VI(t)=C z(x (t),z (t))
dt
which is a linear first order differential equation with a variable term. Then, the general
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solution of this differential equation can be written

'1/;(t) = ePI (A + fe -PI Cz(x * (t) , z * (t))) dt
where A is the constant of integration.
Let us define

Thus, Equation (A -1 ) can be written

'1/;(t) = e

P1

(A + F(t))

Thus,

Therefore,

T·

'I/; (t) =e- P(T· -I)'I/;(T* )- fe-P(.H)cz(X*(s), z*(s)) ds
I

APPENDIXB
The proof of Equation (14)
The Equation (5) is
d'l/; (t)
*
dt
= (p + fJ) '1/2 (t) -

Up

*

*

(x (t), p (t))

with

If/;

17
(T · ) given by current value transversality condition. This can be arranged into

which is a linear first order differential equation with a variable coefficient and a
variable term. Then, the general solution of this differential equation can be written

where A is the constant of integration.
Let us define

Thus, Equation (B -1 ) can be written

If/;(t) = e(p+{3)1 (A + G(t))
and

If/;(T·) = e(p+{3)T" (A + G(t))

Thus,

Therefore,

T"

If/;(t)

= e-(P+{3)(T"-/)If/;(T*)-

fe-P( .H )Up(X*(s),p*(s)) ds
I
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